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Introduction
Causes and Functions of Linguistic Awareness in Language 
Acquisition: Some Introductory Remarks
W.J.M. Levelt, A. Sinclair, and R.J. Jarvella
Max-Planck-Gesel1schaft, Projektgruppe fur Psycholinguistik 
Berg en Dalseweg 79, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
In order to introduce this book to the reader, we will give a short outline 
sketch of the main theoretical and empirical questions that we feel must be 
discussed if one endeavors to study the growth of linguistic awareness in 
the child. This sketch will at the same time be used to introduce the dif­
ferent papers in this book, seen in the light of the general framework which 
emerges. This restriction in viewpoint should be kept in mind. The intro­
duction is not meant to be a review of the contributions to the present 
volume, and will not do justice to all (nor perhaps even the greater part) 
of the issues taken up in the various papers. It will be no more than an 
independent introductory discussion of the field, in which special reference 
is made to the work printed here.
The way we will proceed is as follows. Firstly some examples of the 
kind of data and phenomena with which we are concerned will be presented.
After this purely descriptive section, the main theoretical issues as we see 
them will be discussed in an abstract and rather summary fashion. Few de­
tails will be given, since many of these issues are more extensively dis­
cussed in different places in the book. Rather, we will try to provide a 
peg for connecting some of the theoretical questions raised in the different 
papers. This will be done by concentrating on three central issues: the epis- 
temological status of linguistic awareness, its causation, and its possible 
functions in language acquisition.
2DATA AND PHENOMENA
There are different ways of classifying phenomena of linguistic aware­
ness observable in the child. Ultimately, the classification arrived at 
will depend on one's theory of structure and function in the child's growing 
conception of language. But on a preliminary, atheoretical level, there are 
two obvious ways of structuring the phenomena in question. The first of these 
is to use a criterion of explicitness. Some metalinguistic phenomena are at 
the border of awareness, whereas others are clearly the result of very ex­
plicit reflection on language. Examples of the first extreme are for in­
stance self-corrections, which occur frequently in normal speech, and which 
are readily observable in child speech as well. Re-starts can show that the 
child was aware that what he began or was about to say was inappropriate or 
incorrect. These phenomena of awareness are very ethereal, going mostly 
unnoticed by the listener. For the child speaker they may also pass by on 
the stream of consciousness without leaving a trace.
Explicit reflections on language can likewise be observed in children.
One passage from Gleitman, Gleitman, and Shipley (1972) suffices to show this:
Adult: How about this: Claire loves Claire.
Child (7): Claire loves herself sounds much better.
Adult: Would you ever say Claire loves Claire?
Child: Well, if there is somebody Claire knows named Claire. I
know somebody named Claire, and maybe I'm named Claire, etc.
(p. 150)
The ultimate form of explicitness is what linguists regale us with when they 
formulate their intuitions concerning the structure or grammaticality of 
sentences in the form of rules; and in every child there is a budding lin­
guist.
Between the two extremes one can find various degrees or levels of ex- 
plicitness. Children not only correct themselves, but also others. This 
requires not only awareness of linguistic trouble but at the same time some 
ability to formulate what went wrong. Children spontaneously play with 
language (cf. Weir, 1962), just as they play with other things. In these 
games language becomes divorced from conventional use--it is no longer a 
means of communication, but an object of conscious activity. Games involving 
rhyme and word substitution can be observed quite early in children (Kaper, 
1959). Read's chapter in this volume reports, among other things, on ex­
3periments where children are induced to choose words that rhyme with other 
words. The results provide substantial insight into the children's conception 
of the English vowel system. Even more explicit manipulation of language 
can be observed when the child becomes familiar with the printed word. Again, 
Read's paper gives abundant information about the increasing analytic and 
syntactic capacities which accompany the acquisition of written language. 
Lundberg, in his contribution, gives various experimental indications about 
how these faculties develop. Several linguistic notions in the adult lan­
guage user seem to derive from early stages of explicit phonological and 
morphological analysis through which the child has to pass to acquire reading 
and writing. This seems to be specially true for the notion of "word" itself, 
to which we will return. The most explicit expressions of awareness are ob­
tained by direct questioning, as in the example given above. One can ask 
the child about grammaticality, structure, cohesion of sentence parts, case 
roles (see Braine & Wells, 1978), or appropriateness of speech acts (see 
especially Robinson & Robinson, 1977), and the older the child the more de­
tailed are the answers one receives. Examples of such explicit question- 
answering can be found at various places in this book. Flores d'Arcais asked 
children to judge the similarity of meaning between various connectives and 
between sentences containing the connectives. Question-answering about 
grammaticality is reported in Slobin's paper. And Hirsch, Gleitman, and 
Gleitman interrogated children about ambiguity.
This is not the place to give a full review of the levels of explicit­
ness, and types of phenomena that correspond to them. That is done in a 
detailed fashion in E. Clark's review paper in this book. Rather we would 
like to juxtapose this classification scheme with a second one, which is 
simply the criterion of developmental stage. One may ask which forms of 
linguistic awareness are first to appear, and which come later. Among the 
first phenomena one can observe is the child coping with the failures of 
speech acts. If the one-and-a-half year old child addresses its mother ver­
bally, and the mother pretends not to understand, by saying mhm? for example, 
the child is likely to restate the utterance with minor variations, and this 
may be repeated several times (see for instance, Foppa 1978, and the work 
of Kasermann referred to there). The variations are probably not random (cf. 
Marshall & Morton's paper), and seem to indicate that the child is aware that 
its utterance is in need of some kind of change or improvement. Spontaneous 
self-corrections, i.e., ones not instigated by an adult, occur almost as
4early. These initial expressions of linguistic awareness all seem to serve 
the function of helping establish effective communication, but it is not 
much later that verbal play appears; and this seems to imply awareness of a 
very different form. Verbal play may involve almost any aspect of language, 
witness Weir's (1962) surprising observations, and does not serve any imme­
diate communicative function.
It is not much before the age of five or six that the child begins to 
draw explicit distinctions between the form and meaning of a word or utter­
ance (Papandropoulou & H. Sinclair, 1974, and especially Papandropoulou's 
contribution to the present volume), and it is not yet known when meanings 
and functions of utterances become distinguished as occurs in indirect speech 
acts. At about the same age, the child develops sensitivity to puns and am- 
biguity--the separation of form and meaning permitting him to understand and 
make verbal jokes--and this is evidently an enduring source of enjoyment at 
school age. This sensitivity is the main topic of the chapter by Hirsch, 
Gleitman, and Gleitman. In a controlled experiment, they show that awareness 
of ambiguity develops relatively late in childhood.
The acquisition of reading and writing seems to prefigure the adult 
ability to explicitly discuss the form and function of language. Not only 
are the analytic capacities of the child enormously sharpened by the acquisi­
tion of spelling and writing, but the visual mode dispels with one of the 
major problems the child has previously had to cope with in reflecting on 
his own language: a written word or text remains present and can be studied 
repeatedly; it need not be held in memory to be reflected upon. The chapters 
by Read and Lundberg detail some of these developments. In addition, however, 
formal teaching in school provides children with an extensive metalinguistic 
vocabulary. Not only does the meaning of the word word come into full reach 
of the child, but so do various technical linguistic terms such as syllable3 
noun3 verbj subject3 object3 etc. On the other hand, the development of a 
metalinguistic vocabulary doesn't require explicit teaching. Slobin, in his 
paper, describes the early metalinguistic vocabulary of a bilingual child, 
and Heeschen's article describes a rich metalinguistic vocabulary of an illit­
erate society still in the stone age.
There is an unmistakable connection between the criteria of developmental 
stage and explicitness: the older the child, the greater his facility to 
reflect upon language. It should, however, be stressed that different levels 
of explicitness are simultaneously observable at all stages of development.
5Self-corrections, for instance, are not only very early expressions of lin­
guistic awareness, but very permanent ones as well: they can be observed in 
adult language usage and the young child's speech equally well. The same 
can be said about verbal play, and many other expressions of linguistic aware­
ness. The most comprehensive treatment of relevant data and phenomena in 
this volume can be found in E. Clark, whose contribution pulls together most 
of the evidence on linguistic awareness scattered throughout the literature 
on child language.
THEORETICAL ISSUES
Though the first priority on entering this still largely unexplored area 
is to obtain descriptive evidence about the child's growing linguistic aware­
ness, as much theoretical framework as possible should be kept in mind while 
gathering it. It seems to us that three major theoretical issues should be 
distinguished. These concern: (1) the epistemological status of linguistic 
awareness; (2) the causes of linguistic awareness and insight; and (3) the 
functions of linguistic awareness in development and language use. Let us 
shortly review these issues in turn.
Epistemological Status of Linguistic Awareness
What does it mean to be aware of a linguistic state of affairs? Even 
if one acknowledges that phenomena of linguistic awareness vary greatly, not 
only with respect to explicitness, but also with respect to content, this 
very general preliminary question must nevertheless be asked. One answer, 
which has been rather dominant in the linguistic literature, is that aware­
ness is implicit knowledge that has become explicit. Clearly, this notion 
goes back to Chomsky's theory of linguistic competence. Competence is tacit 
knowledge of the language--it exists in the form of linguistic intuitions, 
which can sometimes be made explicit through questioning or by means of other 
procedures, and may take the outward form of linguistic judgments (concerning 
the acceptability of utterances, etc.). Extensive discussion of the episte­
mological status of this theory can be found in Levelt (1972, 1974), and 
there is no need to repeat it here. The main conclusions, however, are first 
that if there is such a thing as a unified competence underlying all lin­
guistic behavior, then explicit intuitions have at most a highly indirect and 
involved relation to this base of tacit knowledge. Contrary to what has gener­
ally been claimed, the relations between explicit intuitions and underlying
6competence are less direct than those between phenomena of primary language 
usage (speaking, listening) and competence. Second, linguistic judgment is 
a form of behavior which should be explained in its own right, just like any 
other form of linguistic behavior. It has no special epistemological status,. 
This is, more generally, true for linguistic awareness: it is a phenomenon to 
be explained. There is no reason whatsoever to assume that it has a special 
"hot line" to implicit knowledge. This point is taken up further in Seuren's 
contribution to this book. That phenomena of linguistic awareness have no 
privileged status, and require explanation just as other linguistic phenomena 
do, is again strongly argued by Read, and by Hirsch et al. in this volume.
These statements should not be read as implying that linguistic aware­
ness is a "mere" epiphenomenon which accompanies certain unconscious lin­
guistic processes but never play a functional role in them itself. At this 
point one should make an important epistemological distinction. If one is 
aware of a linguistic entity X, X might be one of the causes of this aware­
ness. For instance, X could be built-in property of the language-producing 
mechanism, and be part of the cause of a speaker expressing some form of 
awareness of X. On the other hand, X could be nothing else than the inten­
tional object of the user's awareness, without having any real existence out­
side this intention. This is what could be called the "epiphenomenon" situ­
ation. Finally, X could be both cause and intentional object: the thing one 
is aware of does have a real existence, and (partly) caused awareness to come 
about. This final view is very much in line with a realist interpretation of 
perception. (The real existence of object 0 in part causes the perception 
of 0.) A similar realist interpretation of "being aware of linguistic entity 
X" seems rather strong, and there is reason to be careful not to jump too 
rapidly from an intentional object interpretation of linguistic awareness 
to a cause interpretation.
Perhaps the mechanism proposed in Marshall and Morton's paper comes 
closest to what we have in mind here. We will return to this matter in the 
next paragraphs. For the moment, let us simply stress that neither the adult, 
nor the child, can become aware of the biological or mental machinery in­
volved in language use. In history a similar point has been made over and 
over again with respect to other cognitive abilities. It is what Blihler (1907, 
1908) claimed for conscious phenomena in thinking, Piaget (1974a, 1974b) for 
complex motoric and cognitive performance, and Nisbett and Decamp Wilson (1977) 
for a large variety of cognitive processes. H. Sinclair in this volume
7discusses the Piagetian point of view. She explains that "becoming aware" is 
a mental activity which interacts with other cognitive processes. The subject 
is almost fully unconscious of the internal mechanisms of cognitive function­
ing and of those involved in "becoming aware." Seuren, in his paper, makes 
the same point for linguistic functioning. Nisbett and Decamp Wilson's main 
point is that there is very little evidence in the literature that people are 
conscious of many of their own mental processes. Awareness seems to be re­
stricted to the outcome or results of such processes, and if people do report 
on processes, this is--they contend--usually a logical reconstruction of how 
such a result might have come about (often in the form of a motivation) rather 
than a memory trace of the process itself. It should be added, however, that 
the distinction between process and outcome is not so obvious as it may seem 
at first sight. If knowledge is procedural, as is often claimed in the arti­
ficial intelligence literature, then results of procedures are procedures 
again, and the distinction made by Nisbett and Decamp Wilson fades consider­
ably.
It is especially in the case of "slow" mental processes, such as think­
ing in chess (De Groot, 1965), that subjects seem to be able to describe the 
process more or less on line. In this way protocol analysis contributed quite 
essentially to our knowledge of problem solving (Newell & Simon, 1972).
Whether this is in agreement with Nisbett and Decamp Wilson, or BLihler for 
that matter, is an issue in itself; what is relevant here is that, as opposed 
to problem solvers, language users show practically no insight into the way 
they perceive or produce language. Protocol analysis is simply not a feasible 
technique for analyzing language understanding or production. What is in­
volved is, as a rule, very much in the dark for the language user himself.
It is thus all the more interesting to investigate under what conditions the 
language user does become aware of his speaking or listening processes.
Read, in his article, shows that linguistic awareness can be provoked in 
children, or more precisely that by questioning a child about his language, 
the child acquires access to linguistic structure of which he showed no spon­
taneous awareness beforehand. It is indeed important to make a distinction 
between spontaneous manifestations of awareness (in daily usage), and poten­
tial accessibility of linguistic processes and structures. There is no 
doubt that the latter has definite limits, but these limits and how they 
retreat as the child develops deserve careful examination.
8Causes of Linguistic Awareness
Skills like driving a car can become almost completely automatic with 
increasing experience. By "automatic," we mean that the activity requires 
little conscious attention. For example, while at the wheel an experienced 
driver can simultaneously and attentively discuss a complicated issue with 
his fellow passenger. Skills are, by definition, automated activities, in 
which low-level decisions (such as steering or accelerating) do not require 
conscious attention. Attention can be reserved for more general, high-level 
reflection and decisions (such as where to go, and when to get the tank 
filled). In performing complex skills, moreover, low-level decisions often 
have to be taken far too rapidly to be handled by conscious decision-making.
If they are taken consciously, the activity may become disturbed and break 
down: indeed, this is what we observe in beginning drivers, who do have to 
pay attention to nearly all the elements in the total action pattern. Lin­
guistic skills are no different in this respect (see Levelt & Kempen, 1978; 
Levelt, 1978). In speaking, for instance, low-level decisions— including, 
for example, choice of syntactic frames and articulatory activities— apparent­
ly require no, or almost no, conscious planning decisions. Attention is usu­
ally directed to the content of what is going to be expressed, not to the 
language used for it. The latter develops in a largely automated fashion.
For any skill, however, there are two obvious circumstances where con­
scious reflection or decision-making, and therefore awareness, occur. The 
first one is during skill acquisition, as in the example of learning to drive. 
Automatization of elementary activities is often preceded by a stage of con­
scious learning of these activities. Whether a conscious stage also precedes 
automatization of elementary speech activities during language acquisition 
is still an open question. We will return to this point in the next section.
The second circumstance where awareness can be observed in the execution 
of skills is at moments of failure, i.e., when unexpected or undesired results 
occur. If suddenly the car one is driving starts to skid, one becomes fully 
aware of what is happening, and conscious decision-making may result (if there 
is sufficient time left). A similar claim can be found in Piaget (1974a) 
where the child becomes aware in cases of disequilibrium, i.e., where the 
automatic regulations in performing intentional acts are no longer sufficient 
to attain a goal. It is this mechanism of matching aim and result which H. 
Sinclair in her chapter applies to speech acts. In the same way, a major 
cause for linguistic awareness could be failure in communication, that is,
9in speaking or understanding. Repairs made while speaking, or the registering 
of what? while listening, may occur when automatic processing fails to yield 
the result being sought: a speech error is corrected or there is an attempt 
to remedy a lapse in understanding. Conscious intervention is then required, 
and the language user is--momentarily at least--in some fashion aware of the 
linguistic entity that caused the problem. Problems of this type abound for 
the young child, of course, precisely because his linguistic skills are still 
in a very preliminary stage of development. (For a case study of linguistic 
awareness in a child exposed to several languages, see Slobin's chapter.)
In fact, several papers in this book show how essential this notion of failure 
is for the explanation of early linguistic awareness (cf. especially the 
chapters by E. Clark, H. Sinclair, and Marshall & Morton). There is no need 
to elaborate this point here, and we turn to a set of causes which may be 
involved with more explicit forms of linguistic awareness.
Explicit reflections on language can be obtained from the child (as well 
as from the adult) by asking explicit questions, such as Can one say X? or 
Is X good English? How subjects actually manage to answer such questions is 
largely unknown, but one plausible procedure would be for the language user 
to try to think of a situation in which X can be said. If it is easy to 
imagine such a situation, the answer may well be Yes, if it is too difficult 
to think one up, it may be No. Levelt et al. (1977) tested this theory by 
giving subjects verbal material of borderline grammaticality which related to 
situations that were either easy or difficult to imagine. It was indeed the 
case that the former material was more frequently judged to be grammatical 
than the latter. Subjects also answered more rapidly for material which was 
easy to imagine. Nevertheless, results showed that it was unlikely that the 
subjects, in conceiving their answers, had to find a "full" interpretation for 
the verbal item presented. This was concluded from a comparison with reac­
tion times for a paraphrase task using the same material, which had a very 
different pattern. It is argued in that article that intuitions concerning 
acceptability may result from rather shallow semantic processing; this is in 
line with the findings of Mistler-Lachman (1972) on intuitions concerning 
meaningfulness. In the next section we will return to the possible functions 
of such shallow processing. Answering questions about acceptability and para­
phrase (as in Flores d'Arcais' paper), about morphological structure (as in 
Read's paper), about word length (as in Papandropoulou's and Lundberg's con­
tributions), and so forth, requires what Lundberg calls an "attention shift,"
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i.e., a shift from content to form. Lundberg shows that the difficulty of 
making this shift adheres to general Gestalt principles. The stronger the 
semantic "Gestalt," the harder to break it down.
These few remarks about causation are admittedly vague and of a general 
nature; for these reasons, their value is clearly limited. The origins of 
linguistic awareness may in reality be as varied as the phenomena themselves. 
What induces the child to play linguistically, either alone in self-talk or 
with others by joking, to play rhyming games, and the like? These questions 
are far from being answered, but it might nevertheless be v/orthwhile to ask 
an even more abstract question: Is the genesis of linguistic awareness uni­
versal? And if so, which forms of awareness are universal, and which are 
language or culture specific? A major distinction needs to be made here 
between literate and illiterate societies since learning to read and write 
fosters the development of linguistic notions and reflections that might 
otherwise not easily occur. The notion of "word," let alone notions such 
as "syllable," "sentence," and other general illustrations of phonological 
or syntactic insight, may be very writing-dependent.
Thus, Heeschen in this volume shows that the metalinguistic vocabulary 
of the Eipo speech community, a neolithic mountain people of New Guinea, is 
bound by content and appropriateness, and shows little concern for language 
structure proper. Like other groups, the Eipo are sensitive to various dia­
lect differences with and between their own and neighboring cultures; their 
linguistic beliefs and taboos require that words be "chosen" and "used" with 
care. Even so, the conclusion must be guarded, since Heeschen also found that 
there was high agreement on fixed word and clause orders among the speakers 
of the language he studied. If, on the other hand, the "failure causes aware­
ness" theory is correct, then self-corrections and other similar phenomena 
should be observable in all societies, since "ski 11 ful ness" is a property 
of all normal language use. It is much less trivial to predict whether 
rhyming, or for that matter intuitions of acceptability, are universal. There 
is a major task here for linguistic anthropologists.
A final remark should be made about asking the child metalinguistic 
questions, such as ¿¿^/-questions, that require whole explanations as answers. 
Older children can handle such questions better than younger ones, but it 
is probably false to ascribe this fact solely to a greater reflexive aware­
ness of language. Explaining is a complex verbal activity; the child has 
to express more or less complex ideas or facts in a proper linguistic form.
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This skill is involved in explaining the way or in telling narratives, as 
well as in giving metalinguistic answers. The development of the child's 
capacity to explain verbally shouldn't be confused with his growing capacity 
to reflect on language: methodological care is required to keep these issues 
apart.
The Functions of Linguistic Awareness
For what use do we develop linguistic awareness? As Heeschen points 
out, awareness occurs when there is contact between languages, and historical­
ly, rather than being exceptional, such contact is the rule. We also know 
that a certain sophistication in consciously manipulating language is a 
requirement for learning to read and write (see especially Read, this volume). 
Still, it seems unlikely that evolution has endowed us with awareness of 
language for just these purposes. Such skills seem fairly tangential even 
to basic language use. The more fundamental functions of linguistic aware­
ness should probably be sought for in the facilitative role it plays in face- 
to-face communication, and in learning to communicate. Let us consider 
these in turn.
Linguistic awareness can facilitate communication. In the preceding 
section it was suggested that awareness can be provoked by failure. It may 
arise momentarily when a conversation goes awry. Conscious repair may be 
an effective means of coping with such moments of difficulty and helping 
prevent a deeper breakdown in communication. This situation is not different 
from the one for other complex skills. At a moment of failure, i.e., where 
the automated procedures produce an undesired result, conscious correction 
can often prevent more serious, subsequent failures. What is especially 
interesting about conscious linguistic repairs is that they themselves have 
a rather complex but systematic structure. Schegloff et al.(1977), in a 
recent paper, describe such regularities, and remark that "An adequate theory 
of the organization of natural language will need to depict how a natural 
language handles its intrinsic troubles" (p. 381). Language is a skill which, 
through its sheer complexity, is very fai1ure-prone, and it has developed 
its own mechanisms of coping with this, among them conscious repairing. E. 
Clark's paper in this book especially stresses this function of linguistic 
awareness.
Other mechanisms may have developed in order to prevent failure. In 
the last section we mentioned the shallow processing which seems involved in
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judging the acceptability or meaningful ness of an utterance. One might guess 
that such "monitoring for meaningfulness" does not only take place as a 
consequence of a direct metalinguistic query, but is a general mechanism 
involved in normal language understanding. It is known that we do monitor 
speech we hear for specific acoustic features in order to get some "standards" 
for the correct interpretation of what is to follow. Broadbent and Ladefoged 
(1960) showed that a listener checks for speaker-specific vowel formants in 
the first few syllables a new speaker says, and uses these to interpret the 
vowels to come. It is not likely that a listener makes only phonetic checks. 
More plausibly he also performs syntactic and semantic ones and these may 
also lower the probability of comprehension failures. Presented with Chomsky's 
Colorless green ideas sleep furiously the listener probably will not go into 
an elaborate semantic memory search in order to understand: a shallow pre­
liminary analysis makes it clear that the sentence is meaningless. In this 
way, superficial checks and pretests may have a monitoring function which 
prevents unnecessary processing and false interpretation.
Apart from facilitating communication in various ways, linguistic aware­
ness may play a functional role in the acquisition of communicative skills.
This was mentioned in passing in the preceding section in connection with 
the acquisition of skills in general. The point was made there that, to 
acquire complex skills, a great deal of attention is often required in order 
to correctly perform the elementary actions of the complex action pattern. 
Fluent integration of the skill only follows the automatization of activities 
at the elementary level. It is not clear, and certainly not obvious, that 
this is true for language acquisition as well. But if it is, one would 
expect young, i.e., less skilled, language users to be more aware than mature 
speakers of some of the details involved in speaking. The younger child might 
need to work consciously on superficial aspects of its language, such as 
morphological and articulatory details, whereas the older child is fluent 
in these respects and can direct his attention elsewhere. The evidence for 
this somewhat paradoxical hypothesis--that the young child is more aware of 
certain properties of language and speech than the older one--is admittedly 
scarce. Read (this volume) does show that some phonetic judgments deteriorate 
with age. Adults who are familiar with written forms have to work in order 
to re-acquire distinctions that kindergarten children can make easily. Zei 
(1978), on the other hand, found no evidence that five-year olds were better 
able to explain the articulatory events involved in speaking than nine-year
13
olds. In her study, no comparison was made with adults, however. The issue 
deserves further attention. It may be especially worthwhile to investigate 
which aspects of early speaking and listening activities do receive explicit 
attention during acquisition, and which do not. Knowing this might tell us 
something about the procedures by which the child acquires linguistic skill, 
and about how speaking and listening are organized at different ages.
This brings us finally to the issue of what feedback structure is in­
volved in the acquisition of speech skills. It is essential in the learning 
of any skill that the learner acquire internal standards in order to evaluate 
his own performance. Feedback is not only necessary for comparing standard 
and performance so that deviations which exceed a certain criterion may be 
corrected, but also for the development of the internal standards themselves. 
One theoretically-minded approach, developed by Marshall and Morton in their 
contribution to this volume, is to describe early forms of linguistic aware­
ness in terms of feedback mechanisms which are involved in the acquisition 
of basic linguistic skills. The child's monitoring of (others' and especial­
ly his own) speech may provide him with the opportunity to check and thereby 
raise his own standards of production. Marshall and Morton put forth the 
interesting hypothesis that, as the child learns to speak, the perceptual 
system "teaches" the production system in approximately this way.
These and similar notions of the functions of linguistic awareness in 
language acquisition may well have some face validity. However, as yet none 
of them has been tested experimentally. And experimental tests are necessary. 
Descriptive evidence will not be sufficient, since correlational findings 
cannot answer the essential question of whether conscious awareness of lan­
guage does contribute to first language learning, and if so, whether it is 
a necessary condition as well. Because of the ethics of human subjects 
research, the latter part of this question will probably never be answered. 
The former part, however, is certainly within the reach of systematic experi­
mental study. We hope that this book will contribute to the development of 
such research.
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